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"accommodationist" and "structuralist" approaches in the context of the endogenous money 
hypothesis. The former is usually summarised as stating that the determination of the money supply is 
essentially both credit-driven and demand-determined. The information used for empirical testing 
corresponds to monetary time series data from the Spanish economy covering the period 1987-1998. 
It thus encompasses the period which stretches from the complete liberalisation of commercial banks 
deposit and lending rates in Spain up to the passing over of monetary policy management from the 
Bank of Spain to the European Central Bank. Direct Granger causality tests are then run between the 
monetary base, various money multipliers (using the M1, M2 and M3 definitions) and bank lending to 
the non-bank private sector for the period considered. Overall the results lend strong support for the 
structuralist approach since Granger causality is found to run predominantly from bank lending to the 
monetary base (and thus banks´ reserves) and the various money multipliers. 
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1.- Introduction
 
The main purpose of this study was to test empirically the theoretical controversy between the 
"accommodationist" and "structuralist" approaches in the context of the endogenous money hypothesis. The 
former is usually summarised as stating that the determination of the money supply is both credit-driven and 
demand-determined. The theoretical controversy between the accommodationist and structuralist approaches 
has been portrayed as focusing on two main points (Palley, 1996a). First there is disagreement over the 
significance ascribed to the private initiatives of commercial banks in accommodating increases in loan 
demand. Accommodationists claim that accommodation depends almost exclusively on the willingness of the 
central bank to supply the reserves required by increased bank lending. Structuralists place special emphasis 
on the banks initiatives generally known as "liability management" aimed at reducing their loan : reserve ratio 
in order to accommodate increases in loan demand. Second there is the argument by accommodationists that 
central banks can only follow a policy regime based upon the control of interest rates whereas structuralists 
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claim that the monetary authorities can also implement a policy regime based upon the control of reserves 
(Palley, 1996a, p.585). 
 
The information used for empirical testing of the two approaches corresponds to monetary and financial time 
series data from the Spanish economy covering the period 1987-1998. It encompasses the period which 
stretches from the complete liberalisation of commercial banks´ deposit and lending rates in Spain after the 
change of political regime up to the passing over of monetary policy management from the Bank of Spain to 
the European Central Bank. Direct Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) were then run between the 
monetary base, various money multipliers (using the M1, M2 and M3 money supply definitions) and bank 
lending to the non-bank private sector for the period considered. Overall the results lend strong support for the 
structuralist approach since Granger causality is found to run predominantly from bank lending to the 
monetary base (and thus banks´ reserves) and the various money multipliers. Empirical analysis is extensively 
described in section 4. 
 
 
2.- Theoretical Background
 
The purpose of this section is twofold: (i) define precisely the fundamental point of disagreement or differences 
of emphasis between accommodationists and structuralists and (ii) specify an appropriate way of empirically 
discriminating between these two approaches. The former tasks will be carried out the following way. First we 
introduce what is usually considered as being the essence of the accommodationist approach to the 
determination of the level (and growth rate) of money supply and short-run interest rates. The exposition is 
based on Basil Moore’s ideas (Moore, 1988, ch.6). Second we look at the essential objections to the 
accommodationist approach raised by Pollin (1991). 
 
Since all the tests devised by Pollin in his 1991 paper (see references) in order to discriminate empirically 
between the two approaches were subsequently (and I would argue successfully) criticised by both Moore 
(1991) and Palley (1991) and given that some time later Pollin (1996) himself partially recognised his own 
mistake, we will focus on what, according to us, is left of Pollin’s argument. It will then be argued that the main 
source of disagreement between accommodationists and structuralists rests upon differences of emphasis laid 
upon the initiatives of banks as far as the accommodation of loan demand is concerned. Finally it is argued 
that the test proposed by Palley (1996b) constitutes an adequate approach - albeit with some relatively minor 
modifications - of empirically discriminating between the accommodationist and structuralist approaches. 
 
2.1.- Theoretical controversy
According to Moore (1988) the current Federal Reserve operating procedure is one of "reserve restraint" or 
"dirty" interest rate targeting. The supply of nonborrowed reserves (NBOR) responds automatically within the 
reserve maintenance period to shifts in the demand for reserves, which in turn depends on the amount of new 
loans granted. The former occurs in such a way that these demand shifts needn’t have any effect on the 
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federal funds rate unless the Fed so desires. The degree of reserve restraint target is changed on a 
discretionary basis when a list of key variables (in particular the expected rate of inflation) deviate from the 
preferred behaviour. The federal funds rate is not directly set by the Fed according to this view. However, 
Moore argues that (Moore, 1991, p.124):
 
 
The Fed directly sets the discount rate, directly targets the volume of borrowed reserves, and directly 
determines the implicit cost of discount window funds by the degree to which it administers, monitors, and 
supervises discount-window borrowing, and so largely sets the slope of the upward-sloping supply of 
borrowed reserves functions...Once the discount rate, degree of restraint (nonborrowed reserves), and 
administrative discount-window procedures have been set, the federal funds rate is predetermined within a 
small range, ordinarily within fifty or sixty basis points...Only within this narrow range is it correct to regard 
interest rates as "market-determined." By changing any of the above three parameters, the Fed is able to 
administer the federal funds range so that it lies around whatever level the Fed desires.
 
Banks borrowing from the discount window would face two costs: the explicit cost of borrowing (the discount 
rate) plus the implicit nonpecuniary costs. Those banks that borrow frequently or in relatively large amounts 
come under closer scrutiny. It may also be the case that banks perceived to overuse the window are refused 
credit for a certain period of time (Moore, 1998, p.117). In general, it is argued that the Fed relies on a set of 
lending procedures to limit the amount individual banks can borrow at the discount window, since it intends 
banks to view the discount window only as a "last resort", that is, a residual source of funds when they face 
unexpected needs...This procedure imposes additional implicit surveillance costs on banks that borrow, the 
costs of providing information and negotiating with the Federal Reserve Bank plus the threat of possible future 
denial of access. These nuisance or "frown" costs are sufficient to keep most banks from making use of the 
window unless market rates rise substantially above the discount rate...A Federal Reserve decision not to 
provide nonborrowed reserves in the amounts the banks are required to hold will cause borrowing at the 
discount window to increase, as banks turn to the window to meet required reserves. Since access to the 
window is limited by frequency and amount, policies that force higher discount-window borrowing tend to raise 
short-term interest rates as banks use up their welcome at the window (Moore, 1988, p.118-9).
 
Within this framework, if the Fed did not set nonprice quantity limits on borrowing, banks would never pay 
more than the discount rate to borrow reserves in the federal funds market. However, as explained above, 
Moore argues that the Fed somehow pursues nonprice rationing. By supplying some volume of NBOR relative 
to total required reserves (RR), the Fed directly controls the amount of discount-window borrowing. For a 
certain quantity of required reserves demanded by depository institutions, reducing average NBOR through 
open market sales raises average discount-window borrowing. As borrowings from the discount window 
increase, the marginal effective total cost of obtaining (discount rate plus frown costs) reserves rises above the 
discount rate, after borrowed reserves (BOR) have increased beyond some frictional and variable amount 
(Moore, 1988, p.122). 
 
Through bank arbitrage, the federal funds rate rises pari passu above the official discount rate. Increases in 
NBOR relative to total required reserves operate in a reverse direction to reduce short-term rates. The 
combination of the discount rate and the amount of borrowing tends in a loose way to determine the federal 
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funds rate. In this manner by altering the volume of borrowed reserves, the funds rate, and so the marginal 
cost of funds to banks, the Federal Reserve can move the banking system along the demand for credit 
schedule it faces, provided that the banks continually adjust their administered lending rates. By these 
exceedingly loose linkages the Fed is able to affect the nominal quantity of bank credit demanded and 
consequently the nominal quantity of bank deposits supplied (Moore, 1988, p.122). 
 
In addition to this, Moore argues that if the central bank only sets the supply price but not the supply quantity 
of reserves, the credit money supply function is then horizontal in the market period, at an interest rate 
exogenously administered within some range (Nota 1) by the central bank (Moore, 1991, p.405). We thus 
understand that if a variation in the volume of RR leads to a sustained variation in the level of short-term 
interest rates, it is because the central bank desires so. However, as Moore points out (Moore, 1991) the 
authorities do not hold the level of short-term interest rates constant over long periods of time. Rather, they 
continually respond to changes in the economy as they attempt to move key macroeconomic variables toward 
their preferred target values (Moore, 1991, p.406). The central bank is thus viewed as changing the level of 
short-term interest rates according to a policy reaction function.
 
Having showed what, according to us, are the basic features of the accommodationist approach as far as 
central bank behaviour is concerned, we then move on to present the fundamental objections raised by so-
called structuralists (Pollin, 1991). According to Pollin, the structural endogeneity theory is distinguished from 
the accommodative approach because it does not recognise any commitment on the part of the central bank 
toward pursuing full accommodation of total RR. As a result of it, when central banks choose to restrict NBOR, 
then additional reserves, though not necessarily a fully adequate supply, are generated within the financial 
structure itself -through innovative liability management practices such as borrowing in the federal funds 
market, Eurodollar market, and certificates of deposit markets (Pollin, 1991, p.368). 
 
The argument is two-fold (Pollin, 1991, p.373-4): (i) discount-window borrowing is not a close substitute for 
NBOR and (ii) the central bank exercises its authority to quantity-constrain the reserves it supplies - it will not 
necessarily pursue a fully accommodative stance through open market operations. As for the first point, it is 
argued that the administrative restrictions on discount window borrowing are real and effective. As a result of 
it, it is argued, even though discount rates are typically below money market rates, banks and other 
intermediaries are generally reluctant to seek discount window funds except in emergencies. However, as we 
showed above, this point is clearly shared by Moore (1988) when he recognises both that banks borrowing 
from the discount window face two costs, the explicit cost of borrowing or discount rate plus the implicit 
nonpecuniary costs, and that access to the window is limited by frequency and amount. 
 
As for the second point, it is argued that central banks operate under a set of constraints which limit their 
ability to pursue accommodative open market operations. In particular, while the central bank may recognise 
the contractionary dangers of quantity restrictiveness, it could believe that inflationary dangers associated with 
monetary ease are equally, if not more, problematic. Similarly, the central bank must be concerned that too 
rapid a growth of NBOR could exert downward pressure on the exchange rate value of the national currency...
For many reasons, in short, advocates of structural endogeneity assume that some degree of open market 
restrictiveness is the norm and that such restrictiveness does act as a significant restraint on the quantity of 
reserves supplied by the central bank (Pollin, 1991, p.374). 
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Presumably, Moore’s response to this second point could be framed as follows. If the central bank does not 
supply all the reserves required by banks and short-term market interest rates rise, it is not because the 
central bank pursues a less than fully accommodating strategy as a general rule, but because the central bank 
policy reaction function dictates, at a specific time and under specific circumstances, that a rise in short-term 
interest rates should take place if ultimate policy goals are to be attained. This point has been recently made 
clear by Moore (1998, p.176):
 
 
The terminology "partial" or "complete" central bank accommodation, although widely used, should really be 
abandoned. It is misleading (and confusing) relic of the mainstream vision that the central bank exogenously 
controls the money supply. In the real world, the central bank always fully accommodates bank demand for 
reserves, in its role as residual supplier of system liquidity. In a closed economy, it also must always set the 
level of short-term interest rates. 
 
Therefore, whether or not an increase/fall in the demand for reserves ends up leading to a rise/fall in short-
term interest rates -leaving liability management aside for the time being- will depend on the specific 
circumstances faced by the central bank and the economy. Particularly, it will depend upon the deviation of the 
actual values of the ultimate goals of monetary policy from their target values, that is, it will depend on the 
variation in interest rates implied by the policy reaction function. Interest rates are thus an autonomous policy 
instrument. Their level depends on how central banks choose to respond (Moore, 1991, p.406). The essence 
of the "reserve price setting" position is, according to Moore (1991, p.408), that solvent individual banks can 
always obtain additional reserves at the market rate. However, Pollin replied (1991, p.370-1):
 
 
It is difficult to see why liability management should emerge as a sustained and systematic practice for 
financial intermediaries once one assumes that BOR are perfect substitutes for NBOR, and that therefore no 
effective quantity constraint exists. Liability management requires that intermediaries with insufficient reserves 
to meet loan demand pay market interest rates for funds acquired through federal funds borrowing, 
repurchase agreements, issuing certificates of deposits or rather similar practices. Intermediaries will 
acquiesce in paying market rates on such instruments only if they could not expect to obtain the funds they 
need more cheaply and/or readily through accommodative open market operations and discount window 
borrowing, frown costs included...In the aggregate, an institutional framework where no quantity constraint 
exists would not encourage the systematic practice of liability management. 
 
Further, according to Pollin, one implication of this systematic practice of liability management is that, when 
one takes account of changes in legal reserve requirements, the accommodationist position of a horizontal 
supply curve implies that loans and reserves will grow at a proportional rate. If that is not the case, he goes on 
to argue, it is because some significant barriers to full accommodation are present (Pollin, 1991, p.371). An 
obvious objection to this argument can be found in Palley (1991, p.401):
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Pollin argues that the accommodationist perspective predicts a stationary loan : reserve ratio. The apparent 
logic is that since banks can get all the reserves they want at a fixed interest rate, loans and reserves expand 
proportionately. In my opinion, this is incorrect. Banks are profit maximizers, and reserve requirements 
represent an implicit cost since they reduce the amount of each dollar of deposits banks can lend out. 
Consequently banks have an incentive to innovate to avoid these requirements. Such innovations involve 
introducing new liabilities with lower or no reserve requirements. As a result the loan : reserve ratio is 
characterised by an upward secular trend under both the structuralist and the accommodationist perspectives. 
 
In a similar way, Moore argues that the stability of the loan : reserve ratio is, in no sense, a test for the two 
approaches. Banks, he argues, make loans first, and look for the reserves later. In the process, they 
continually seek to reduce their effective reserve requirements, since reserves are nonearning assets (Nota 2) 
(Moore, 1991, p.407). What emerges from this response is that a test on the stationarity in mean levels of the 
loan : reserves ratio of banks can not constitute a legitimate way of discriminating between the 
accommodationist and structuralist approaches. Nevertheless Pollin (1991; 1996) set up two additional 
empirical tests to discriminate between the two approaches: (i) close substitutability between NBOR and BOR 
and (ii) causality running from the central bank to financial market interest rates. In the first case, Pollin argues 
that an implication of the accommodationist approach is that BOR and NBOR are close substitutes, whereas 
in the structuralist approach they are not. He adds that BOR could be considered close substitutes for NBOR if 
in formal statistical tests, changes in the growth of NBOR have a significant inverse relationship with changes 
in BOR (Pollin, 1991, p.372; Pollin, 1996, p.506-7). 
 
However, as Palley (1991, p.401) pointed out, an accommodationist might respond that when the Fed wishes 
to reduce NBOR, it may well be that it wants to raise interest rates. If that is the case, it is very likely that it will 
simultaneously take other actions such as raising the discount rate, which discourages discount-window 
borrowing. Putting it a different way, if the Fed wants to raise interest rates, it is likely that it will reduce NBOR 
along with other actions such as discouraging discount-window borrowing. As a result of it, if the empirical 
evidence shows that BOR and NBOR have not a significant inverse relationship, then the former is not 
necessarily supportive of the structuralist approach whatsoever. 
 
Moore’s objection to Pollin’s second test is as follows (1991, p.409). He argues that when total reserves are 
constant, then we would expect that an increase/decrease in NBOR would be accompanied by a decrease/
increase in BOR. As a result of it, whenever the change in total reserves is zero (or very small), changes in 
NBOR will be negatively correlated with changes in BOR (Moore, 1991, p.409). However, when total reserves 
are rising - as it is normally the case in a growing economy - then an increase in NBOR which is lower than the 
increase in required reserves (RR) will necessarily take place alongside an increase in BOR, since the central 
bank will have to supply the additional reserves through discount-window borrowing by banks. It might be the 
case that, as a result of an increase in RR, the central bank raises NBOR but reduces BOR by simultaneously 
purchasing banks’ securities (through open market operations) and rising the discount rate. Thus depending 
on central bank policy, positive, negative or zero correlation between NBOR and BOR will be consistent with 
BOR and NBOR being perfect substitutes (Moore, 1991, p.409).
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The third test set up by Pollin aims at testing accommodationists’ claim that causality always runs from those 
interest rates controlled by central banks to overall rate behaviour against structuralists’ claim that there is a 
two-way causality between central bank-controlled rates and the other interest rates. According to Pollin, if 
central bank- controlled interest rate changes do lag the market to a statistically significant extent, this would 
suggest that there is a substantive basis for the market’s sequentially prior action. Moore’s objection to this 
test (Moore, 1991, p.411) is that evidence of two-way causality between central bank-controlled rates and 
other market rates does not allow us to discriminate between the accommodative and structuralist 
approaches. This is so because current market rates embody expectations about future short-term rates 
(closely controlled by the central bank). As a result of it, according to Moore, evidence of two-way causality 
would even be supportive of the accommodative approach when properly interpreted. 
 
A tempting response to Moore is that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates is not 
universally accepted, so that his objections critically depend on the expectations hypothesis being the correct 
theory of long-term interest rate determination. Yet as far as it is usually argued the "markets" consider 
expected future short-term interest rates as an important factor determining the term structure of interest rates, 
and to the extent that what matters in such cases is what the "markets" believe that matters, then the 
prophecy is likely to come true. In consequence, we thus share with Moore the view that the sort of causality 
test set up by Pollin should not be used to discriminate between the two approaches. 
 
 
2.2.- Causality
 
The question that emerges from the discussion above is whether there is a sensible way of discriminating 
between the accommodationist and structuralist approaches. It is argued below that the test set up by Palley 
(1996b, p.118-20) is not subject to the sort of objections and misinterpretation problems encountered by the 
tests set up by Pollin (1991). On the basis of what we understand to be the main point of disagreement we 
explain why the test proposed by Palley represents a reasonable way of empirically discriminating between 
the two approaches. 
 
It was said above that, according to our own interpretation of the accommodationist approach, increases in RR 
(for instance brought about by increases in loan demand) would lead to interest rate rises only to the extent 
that the central bank policy reaction function dictates it. We understand this is the way Moore’s statement that 
solvent individual banks can always obtain additional reserves at the market rate must be understood (Moore, 
1991, p.408). However, we also think there is a point in the structuralist approach that has been overlooked by 
accommodationists (Nota 3) . In particular, it will normally be the case that, during an upswing in the economy, 
borrowing by the non-bank private sector, deposits and reserves expand. As the economy booms inflationary 
pressures may emerge at some point which, in turn, will prompt the central bank -in implementation of its 
policy reaction function- to rise short-term interest rates. Reserve restraint will ensue. Although it is likely that 
individual banks will be able to obtain all the additional reserves they need at the new (higher) interest rate set 
up by the central bank -and in this sense the reserve supply curve could be seen as being horizontal at the 
(new) higher short-term rate- the rise in the federal funds rate will somehow encourage banks to search for 
alternative sources of funds with lower reserves requirements. The former may not be an attractive source of 
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funds for banks when they are not running short of reserves and the federal funds rate is relatively low -
presumably because banks have not yet used up their initial welcome at the discount window- but they might 
become increasingly attractive for banks as the federal funds rate reaches relatively high levels. 
 
If we think of these alternative sources of funds as consisting of either transformation of demand into time 
deposits or the issuing of certificates of deposit, clearly the interest rate to be paid on them will be relatively 
higher than the interest rate to be paid on demand deposits. If we think of the alternative sources of funds as 
being the eurocurrency markets, then the higher cost may well take the form of higher transaction costs 
associated to currency exchange which, for a given borrowing rate, will turn them into a relatively expensive 
source of funds. In both cases, their use is only desirable when the federal funds or interbank market rate has 
reached a relatively high level. As arbitrage between these markets and the federal funds market takes place, 
banks will be able to carry out a transformation of the liability side of their balance sheets allowing them to 
reduce their loan : reserves ratio (Nota 4) . Along with the transformation of banks’ balance sheets, liability 
management may also include the discovering of new financial products aimed at further reducing banks’ 
loan : reserves ratio.
On the opposite, during a downswing we will observe a tendency for interest rates to fall as inflationary 
pressures in the economy weaken and, consequently, the central bank relaxes its monetary policy. Both loan 
demand and deposit growth rates will slow down. Banks will feel less pressure to search for sources of funds 
with lower reserve requirements as both their loan : reserve ratio and the federal funds rate fall. The former 
does not mean that banks will stop searching for new financial products which allow them to further reduce the 
loan : reserves ratio. It simply means that the pressure to find these new products will now be lower and that, 
conceivably, other things being the same, the rate of financial innovation will tend to slow down and, in a more 
general sense, the intensity of liability management (innovative or not) will decrease. 
 
However, once innovative liability management during the economic upswing has proved successful (Nota 5 ) , 
the new financial products will be available thereafter whatever the pressure banks have to find alternative 
sources of funds with lower reserve requirements. Thus we would expect the loan : reserve ratio, and 
consequently the various money multipliers, to have a secular upward trend. Therefore, although both Moore 
and Palley similarly argue that banks, as profit-maximizers, will continually be seeking to reduce their loan : 
reserve ratio, it is reasonable to expect that both the intensity of liability management, and consequently, the 
rate of growth of money velocity (Nota 6) (as well as the rate of growth of the money multipliers) usually rise 
when monetary policy is tightened and fall when monetary policy is relaxed. Putting it in a slightly different 
way, we would expect liability management activities to intensify during the upswing as the central bank rises 
interest rates, and we would expect them to slow down during the downswing as inflation goes down and the 
central bank lowers interest rates.
 
As a result of it, once the various time series considered have either been made stationary or a cointegrating 
relationship (Nota 7) has been found to exist between the pair of series considered, if the accommodationist 
approach portrays a picture of loan demand accommodation by banks closer to reality than the picture 
portrayed by the structuralist approach we should get the following results (Nota 8) . First we should be able to 
reject the null hypothesis that bank lending Granger causes the money multipliers (Nota 9 ) . In addition, we 
should not be able to reject both the null hypotheses that bank lending Granger causes the monetary base 
(Palley, 1996b, p.118) and that reserves (or the monetary base) Granger cause bank lending. In turn, if the 
structuralist approach is to be validated, we should not be able to reject the null hypothesis that bank lending 
Granger causes both the monetary base and the various money multipliers. 
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3.- Monetary Policy in Spain in the last two decades
It is the purpose of this section to review the most important developments that have taken place in Spanish 
monetary policy in recent times. In particular, this section has two main objectives. First it aims at providing 
some useful insights into the institutional framework which has characterized monetary policy in Spain during 
the last two decades. Second it purports to identify possible structural breaks in the time series used in the 
study. In the light of the information provided, it will be argued that the specific institutional arrangements of 
monetary policy in Spain throughout this period did not significantly differ from US monetary policy (as 
described in section 2) thereby making it relevant to study the relative importance of liability management for 
loan demand accommodation as similar studies for the US economy previously did. In addition, as we will 
show in next section, a structural break in the form of a permanent level shift occurred in March 1990 in the 
aftermath of a substantial reduction in required reserves by the Bank of Spain. The former may have a 
significant impact on the results of the unit root tests that will be implemented further forward. Section (3.1) 
contains a general overview of monetary policy in Spain from the second half of the eighties whereas section 
(3.2) focuses on some basic institutional features of monetary policy operational procedures.
 
 
3.1.- An overview of monetary policy in Spain 
 
As we pointed out above, the choice of 1987 as the starting year for our study is due to two reasons. First, 
there is the fact that banks´ lending and deposit rates were not completely liberalized in Spain until that year 
(Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España, 1997, p.93). Second, short-term interest rates became the basic 
monetary policy instrument (Nota 10 ) the same year (Rodríguez, Parejo, Cuervo and Calvo, 1996, p.122). In the 
1980s Spanish monetary policy was strongly influenced by Spain´s entry into the European Community, an 
event which actually took place in 1986. A consequence of that important political development was the 
resulting need to reduce the volatility of both interest rates and the exchange rate. For instance in the period 
1984-1989 (June) monetary policy was still characterized by the setting of a growth rate for a broad monetary 
aggregate as an intermediate target. However, despite the setting of target growth rates for monetary 
aggregates throughout the 1980s a gradual shift in the monetary policy regime was already under way. The 
Bank of Spain was attaching increasing importance to a nominal exchange rate indicator of the peseta vis a 
vis the main European currencies (representing the main trade partners except Portugal and Greece) as an 
argument of its policy reaction function across this period. From 1988 onwards, the bilateral exchange rate 
against the Deutsche mark was substituted for the aforementioned exchange rate indicator. 
 
In an attempt to reinforce the battered credibility of Spanish monetary authorities, the peseta joined the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in June 1989 with a 6% fluctuation margin in each direction. As a result of 
the new institutional arrangement, the broad monetary aggregate previously used as an intermediate target 
eventually turned into just another economic indicator thus turning short-term nominal interest rates into the 
main instrument used to keep the exchange rate within its fluctuation threshold. In addition, a widening of the 
fluctuation margins within the EMS aimed at ending speculative attacks upon the weaker currencies took place 
in summer 1993 allowing them to fluctuate as much as % thereafter. 
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Therefore Spanish monetary policy from 1987 to 1995 basically consisted in the maintenance of a target long-
term nominal value for the exchange rate vis a vis the main European currencies (in practice the Deutsche 
mark). The determination of the level of short-term interest rates aimed at making monetary and credit 
aggregates grow at a pace compatible with the sustainability of the long-run target exchange rate. Insofar as 
the achievement of this long-run target exchange rate entailed the convergence of the rate of inflation towards 
the average level (lower) prevailing in the core European economies, Spanish real interest rates had to remain 
relatively high. In such a context of high capital mobility high real interest rates led to powerful capital inflows 
which put upward pressure on the peseta exchange rate against most other European currencies. Finally the 
Bank of Spain abandoned the regime based upon the setting of an exchange rate target against the Deutsche 
mark in 1995 and an inflation-targeting strategy with no intermediate target was adopted. The new monetary 
policy regime worked successfully until December 1998 when the launching of the Eurocurrency led to the 
transfer of monetary policy away from the Bank of Spain to the European Central Bank. 
 
 
3.2.- Monetary policy instruments
 
Prior to 1987 the determination of the degree of restraint of monetary policy was based upon the setting of a 
target growth rate for the level of banks´ reserves. Thereafter Spanish monetary policy was based upon the 
control of short-term nominal interest rates. In turn open-market operations became the basic instrument used 
for the determination of the degree of restraint of monetary policy. The former usually took place through 
repurchase agreements of Certificates of Deposit issued by the central bank (Nota 11) (CDs) and Treasury Bills 
(TB) on a decennial (ten days) and daily basis using the striking-price auction system (Nota 12) . As a result of it, 
the interest rate set by the Bank of Spain in the decennial auctions of CDs and TB became the reference 
interest rate for the interbank market and monetary policy. Therefore the Bank of Spain basically set the short-
term rate of interest or degree of restraint of monetary policy through the determination of the marginal interest 
rate of auctions in decennial open-market operations.
 
In addition to open-market operations carried out on a daily or a decennial basis, there was still an additional 
monetary policy instrument in the form of a last-resort credit device. The former was an instrument akin to the 
discount-window system described in section 2 when we reviewed the US Fed operational procedures. 
However a slight difference exists. The discount rate set by the Fed is always lower than the Federal Funds 
rate, whereas the interest rate set by the Bank of Spain was always above the money market rate. The former 
is due to the fact that, as borrowing by individual banks from the Fed´s discount-window exceeds a certain 
threshold, non-pecuniary marginal costs of borrowing gradually increase thereby encouraging banks to limit 
discount-window borrowing to exceptional cases. In contrast, the Bank of Spain did not rely on the imposition 
of non-pecuniary costs upon the last-resort credit device interest rate, but simply set this interest rate slightly 
above the money market rate thus encouraging banks to make use of this credit source only under exceptional 
circumstances. As a result of it the last-resort credit device became a marginal monetary policy instrument all 
throughout the period considered. 
 
Having said this, we believe the institutional arrangements of monetary policy in Spain did not differ 
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significantly from US monetary policy throughout the period considered. In particular we think that within this 
institutional framework it is still possible to argue that the reserves´ supply curve banks faced was horizontal at 
the interest rate set by the monetary authorities. Therefore we understand that all the conclusions of section 2, 
especially those ones referred to the test proposed by Palley carry over to the current section.
 
 
4.- Evaluating competing models: some empirical evidence from Spain
 
The current section contains the statistical analysis of monetary data from the Spanish economy. The purpose 
of the analysis is to discriminate empirically between the two competing approaches to the process of loan 
demand accommodation by banks. The sample period is 1987:01 - 1998:10. The data is in average monthly 
form, and drawn from the Boletín Económico del Banco de España. The original time series were initially 
filtered by taking logarithms. All subsequent estimates were by ordinary least squares. The procedure followed 
had two stages. First, since stationarity is a requirement for the implementation of Granger causality tests 
(Granger, 1969, p.431) we checked all series for stationarity. This was done by means of graphical inspection 
in the first place and unit root tests in the second place. In turn, graphical inspection included the observation 
of the actual behaviour of the series and their corresponding correlograms. 
 
The unit root tests implemented were in the standard and Perron´s version (depending on whether or not a 
structural break was observed) of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. In the first case we used Mackinnon´s 
critical values (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, p.703) whereas in the second case critical values tabulated by 
Perron (Franses, 1998, p.151) were used. After having checked all series for stationarity Granger causality 
tests were run using five different lag lengths for the autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) relations (Nota 13 ) . 
The variables definitions used throughout the analysis are the following (Nota14 ) : 
 
LBM = log of monetary base
Lm1 = log of M1 money multiplier
Lm2 = log of M2 money multiplier
Lm3 = log of M3 money multiplier
LLoans = log of loans
 
 
4.1.- Stationarity analysis
http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/cee/doc/9920/9920.htm (11 de 30)29/02/2008 15:16:25
Accomodationists versus structuralists: some empirical evidence from Spain (1987-98)
 
Stationarity analysis starts off with the visual inspection of the logarimths of the series in levels. Figures 1 and 
2 below show that all variables display an upward trend. The former is very clear for LLoans and LBM but 
there is also evidence that there has been positive growth of Lm1, Lm2 and Lm3 over time. In addition the 
figures show that all the variables except LLoans experienced a structural break in the form of a permanent 
upward (downward for LBM) level shift in 1990:03. As we indicated in the previous chapter, a substantial 
reduction in required reserves was implemented by the Bank of Spain in March 1990. The result of such 
reduction was a sudden fall in the monetary base as banks were obliged to purchase Certificates of Deposits 
issued by the Bank of Spain. Insofar as money supply did not experience an equivalent fall the money 
multipliers shifted upwards.
 
Source: Boletín económico del Banco de España
 
FIGURE 1
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Source: Boletín económico del Banco de España
FIGURE 2
Visual inspection of the correlograms of Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix (section 2.1) corroborates our initial 
judgement. The correlograms show that Lm1, Lm2 and Lm3 display the usual pattern for a non-stationary 
series with the autocorrelation coefficients dying out. The correlograms for LBM and LLoans are not so clear-
cut, but somehow point in the same direction. Unit root tests suited for trending (Nota 15) time series were run 
and the results were compiled in Table 1 below. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were run for all series. 
Critical values tabulated by Mackinnon (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, p.703) were used in the ADF test for 
LLoans. The presence of a documented permanent level shift in all remaining series invalidated these critical 
values for a standard ADF test . (Nota 16) Consequently asymptotic critical values tabulated by Perron (Franses, 
1998, p.151) for ADF tests in the presence of a level shift at a known date were used in the ADF tests run for 
Lm1, Lm2, Lm3 and LBM. 
 
 t-value (lag length) Critical values
Lm1 -3.963 (3)** -3.30/-3.88
Lm2 -4.330 (5)** -3.30/-3.88
Lm3 -3.458 (5)* -3.30/-3.88
LBM -6.844 (5)** -3.30/-3.88
LLoans -2.0539(0)NR -3.445/-4.032 
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* indicates that the null hypothesis  can be rejected at the 5% significance level but can not be rejected at the 1% 
level.
 
** indicates that the the null hypothesis  is rejected at the 1% significance level. 
NR indicates that the null hypothesis  can not be rejected at the 5% significance level.
The unit root test for LLoans also included a seasonal following the observation of the correlogram for DLLoans. The first 
number in the column containing the critical values corresponds to the 5% significance level whereas the second number 
corresponds to the 1% significance level. Finally, the numbers in parenthesis indicate the lag length used in the ADF test.
 
TABLE 1
 
The second column in Table 1 shows the t-values and the lag length used in the ADF test . (Nota 17) The third 
column shows the corresponding critical values. The test format used varied depending on whether a standard 
ADF or Perron´s version of the ADF test was run (see section 1.1 in the appendix). If the unit root hypothesis 
can not be rejected that means that the trending series´ data generating process (DGP) is a random-walk with 
drift. As Table 1 shows, the unit root hypothesis can be actually rejected for Lm1, Lm2 and LBM at the 1% 
significance level, but it can only be rejected for Lm3 at the 5% significance level, and it can not be rejected at 
all for LLoans. Therefore these results indicate that all series except LLoans and Lm3 are best described by a 
trend stationary process. However, the fact that the unit root hypothesis can not be rejected for LLoans and 
Lm3 entails the need to check for the number of unit roots in these two series. 
 
Next, inspection of the first-difference of LLoans and Lm3 (DLLoans and DLm3) revealed that the presence of 
a unit root was unlikely since neither their mean nor their variance exhibited a trend. Figures 3 and 4 below 
lend support for this claim. They show the behaviour of these two series in first-differences (approximately the 
rate of growth). Inspection of their corresponding correlograms in Figure 7 in the appendix (section 2.2) 
provides additional support in the case of DLm3 since it is white-noise. DLLoans also appears to be stationary. 
In addition the high autocorrelation coefficient for the twelfth lagged value suggested the presence of a 
seasonal component. The former was taken into account when running the corresponding unit root test.
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Source: Boletín económico del Banco de España
 
 
FIGURE 3
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Source: Boletín económico del Banco de España
 
 
FIGURE 4
 
Unit root tests were then run for DLLoans and DLm3 in order to determine whether the series in levels 
contained more than one unit root. The procedure we used was the same than for the series in levels except 
that this time the ADF test format applied did not assume the presence of a time trend (Nota 18 ) (see section 
1.2 in the appendix). As Table 2 shows, the unit root null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance 
level. The former implie that Lm3 and LLoans did not contain more than one unit root and were thus integrated 
of order 1. 
 
 
 
t-statistic with constant included (lags) Critical values with constant included
DLm3 -4.0084 (4) ** -2.884/-3.483
DLLoans -9.777 (0)** -2.884/-3.483
 
** indicates that the the null hypothesis  is rejected at both the 1% significance level. 
The unit root test for DLLoans includes a seasonal following the observation of the correlogram for DLLoans. The first 
numerical value in the column containing the critical values corresponds to the 5% significance level whereas the second 
value corresponds to the 1% significance level. Finally, the numbers in parenthesis indicate the lag length used in the ADF 
test. The critical values are those tabulated by Mackinnon since the series did not exhibit any structural break.
 
 
TABLE 2
 
The results above allowed us to go ahead with the causality analysis. Since stationarity is a requirement for 
the implementation of the Granger causality tests and all series exhibited a trend we previously transformed all 
of them in order to induce stationarity. In the case of Lm1, Lm2 and LBM we detrended them, that is, we run a 
regression on time (since they all were found to be trend-stationary processes) whereas in the case of Lm3 
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and LLoans they were differenced once (because they were found to be random-walks with drift or difference-
stationary process and integrated of order 1). Thereafter the detrended counterparts for Lm1, Lm2 and LBM 
have been referred to as DTLm1, DTLm2 and DTLBM respectively (Nota 19) . The stationary counterparts for 
both Lm3 and LLoans continued to be referred to as DLm3 and DLLoans. 
 
4.2.- Granger-causality tests
 
In section 2 it was argued that a slightly modified version of the test proposed by Palley (1996b, p.118) was an 
appropiate way to discriminate between the accommodationist and structuralist approaches. It was also 
argued that were the accommodationist approach to be supported as a better description of loan demand 
accommodation by banks than the description provided by the structuralist approach, once the series had 
been made stationary, we should get the following result: (i) we should be able to reject the null hypothesis 
that bank lending Granger causes the various money multipliers and that the monetary base Granger causes 
lending and (ii) we should not be able to reject the null hypothesis that bank lending Granger causes reserves 
(or the monetary base). In contrast, validation of the structuralist approach would actually require that the null 
hypothesis that bank lending Granger causes both the monetary base and the money multipliers was not 
rejected. The postulated hypotheses are shown in Table 3 below.
 
 
Accommodationist
DLLoans => DLBM but DLBM > DLLoans
DLLoans > DLm1 and DLm1 > DLLoans
DLLoans > DLm2 and DLm2 > DLLoans
DLLoans > DLm3 and DLm3 > DLLoans
Structuralist DLLoans => DLBM 
DLLoans => DLm1 
DLLoans => DLm2 
DLLoans => DLm3 
 
 
TABLE 3
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Once the postulated hypotheses had been clearly stated, it remained to set up an operational definition of 
causality in Granger´s sense. The following definition represents a slight reformulation of the original one for 
two-variable models which appears in Granger (1969, p.431), modified to account for the case of non-zero 
mean variables (Nota 20 ) . Thus let  and  be two stationary time series with non-zero means. The simple 
causal model is
 
 (1) 
 
 (2)
 
where  and  are taken to be two uncorrelated white-noise series. 
 
The definition of causality proposed by Granger implies that  is causing  provided some  is not zero. 
Similarly,  is causing  if some  is not zero. If both of these events occur, according to Granger´s 
definition (Granger, 1969, p.428), there is said to be a feedback or bivariate relation between  and . The 
results from the Granger causality tests between bank lending to the non-bank private sector, the money 
multipliers for the M1, M2 and M3 aggregates and the monetary base are shown in Table 4 below. The first 
column contains the explanatory and dependent variables in each test and its result. A => means that the left-
hand side variable Granger-causes the right-hand side variable, whereas a > means just the opposite. The 
remaining columns contain the results of the F-tests (Nota 21 ) for five different values of the lag length in 
equations (1) and (2). The first numerical value in each column represents the F-statistic whereas the numbers 
in parenthesis correspond to the probability value or probability that the null hypothesis be true.
 
 18 Lags 12 Lags 9 Lags 6 Lags 3 Lags
DLLoans=>DTLBM 1.4997
(0.1099)
2.0742
(0.0248)**
2.6457
(0.0081)***
2.42
(0.0303)**
1.2933
(0.2795)
DTLBM=>DLLoans 1.4491
(0.1301)
1.9626
(0.0351)**
2.2469
(0.0238)**
1.1908
(0.3157)
0.51729
(0.6711)
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DLLoans =>DTLm1 1.6169
(0.0735)*
1.8429
(0.0505)* 
2.09343
(0.0357)**
2.4343
(0.0294)**
2.9229
(0.0364)**
DTLm1=>DLLoans 1.459
(0.1259)
1.7711
(0.0626)*
1.4769
(0.1649)
3.022
(0.0087)***
1.0498
(0.3729)
DLLoans=>DTLm2 1.3915
(0.1568)
1.5188
(0.1290)
1.9828
(0.0476)**
2.6429
(0.0191)**
3.7539
(0.0126)**
DTLm2 =>DLLoans 1.2684
(0.2292)
1.6772
(0.0824)*
1.4983
(0.1570)
2.8198
(0.0132)**
0.88343
(0.4516)
DLLoans =>DLm3 1.6423
(0.0672)*
1.7005
(0.0770)*
1.5329
(0.1448)
2.1494
(0.0525)*
2.7976
(0.0427)**
DLm3 > DLLoans 0.63617
(0.8613)
0.89753
(0.5520)
1.0444
(0.4096)
0.80011
(0.5717)
0.14891
(0.9302)
 
*** indicates that the null hypothesis can not be rejected at the 1% level
 
** indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance level but can not be rejected at the 5% 
significance level.
* indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level but can not be rejected at the 10% 
significance level.
 
 
TABLE 4
 
The first comment we can make in relation to the results in Table 4 is that, overall causality predominantly runs 
from bank lending to all the remaining variables. In principle, this result provides strong support for the 
endogenous money hypothesis independently of the specific approach supported. When it comes to 
discriminating between the accommodationist and structuralist approaches the evidence is supportive of the 
structuralist approach. As Table 4 shows, bank lending to the non-bank private sector (DLLoans) Granger 
causes both the monetary base (and therefore reserves) and all the money multipliers. The former necessarily 
entails the rejection of the accommodationist approach since, once innovative liability management or financial 
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innovation has been removed by making all series stationary, there is no reason to expect bank lending to 
Granger cause the various money multipliers unless banks resort to liability management practices to 
accommodate increased loan demand by the non-bank private sector. In addition, there is evidence to support 
Granger causality running from DLBM (9 and 12 lagged values), DTLm1 (6 and 12 lagged values) and DTLm2 
(6 and 12 lagged values) to DLLoans, although the evidence here is not so clear-cut as in the opposite 
direction. Bivariate causality also implies, in our scheme, refutation of the accommodationist approach. 
 
A second comment refers to the different effect of bank lending upon the various money multipliers. Bivariate 
causality appears to exist for the M1 and M2 money multipliers, whereas it appears to be non-existent for the 
M3 money multiplier. This result does not have any straightforward explanation. A possible form of liability 
management practice by banks in the context of increased loan demand is to induce its customers to shift 
away from demand deposits and into time deposits through interest rate changes (Palley, 1996b, p.116). This 
strategy occurs because the latter nearly always have lower reserve requirements than the former. If this was 
the case, we would expect the M3 rather than the M2 and M1 money multipliers to exhibit bivariate causality 
with bank lending, since the latter would be subject to a substitution effect (shifting away from demand 
deposits and into time deposits) that might weaken the otherwise dominating income effect (demand deposits 
expansion brought about by increased bank lending). However, the result we have got is precisely the 
opposite. 
 
One possible explanation for this is strictly econometric and points to the fact that Lm3 was differenced rather 
than detrended because we could not reject the unit root null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. We 
therefore assumed that the DGP was a random-walk with drift rather than a trend-stationary process (TSP). In 
order to get out of this puzzle we repeated the Granger causality test assuming that Lm3 was actually a TSP 
(we detrended Lm3) and the result we got was the following:
 
 18 Lags 12 Lags 9 Lags 6 Lags 3 Lags
DLLoans => DTLm3
DTLm3 > DLLoans
1.9658
(0.0204)**
0.63316
(0.8613)
2.0598
(0.0260)**
1.3496
(0.2026)
2.5279
(0.0112)**
0.76796
(0.6461)
2.3992
(0.0316)**
0.78188
(0.5857)
3.1212
(0.0279)**
0.25704
(0.8562)
 
** indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance level but can not be rejected at the 5% 
significance level.
* indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level but can not be rejected at the 10% 
significance level.
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TABLE 5
 
As Table 5 indicates the results were approximately the same as before. Bank lending was found to Granger 
cause the M3 money multiplier, but the latter was not found to Granger cause the former. Therefore it seems 
that the explanation to this puzzling result is not of the econometric type. A second possible explanation is that 
the sort of banks´ balance sheet liability side transformation that seems to come about in the aftermath of loan 
expansion does not predominantly entails shifting away from demand deposits and into time deposits but 
shifting away from demand deposits and into other alternative financial assets issued by banks which have not 
been included under the M3 definition we used. However testing of this hypothesis would require analysing 
Granger causality between bank lending and some monetary aggregates broader than M3, a task which 
exceeds the purpose of this study. 
 
The third and final comment refers to the relative importance of the substitution and income effects of bank 
lending expansion upon money supply. As Palley (1996b, p.116) points out, whether the narrow money supply 
(M1 and M2 in our case) rises in response to increased lending is ambiguous owing to offsetting income and 
interest rate effects. The induced rise in loans and nominal income increases the demand for checkable 
deposits, but the subsequent rise in interest rates reduces demand. Insofar as the same pattern applies to 
currency demand, the narrow money supply only rises if the income effect prevails. What emerges from the 
results above is that the income effect actually dominates since both the M1 and M2 money multipliers are 
positively correlated with bank lending. The income effect also dominates in the M3 money multiplier case. 
 
 
5.- Conclusions
 
The purpose of this study was to discriminate empirically between what is known in the economic literature as 
the accommodationist and structuralist approaches to loan demand accommodation by commercial banks in 
the context of the endogenous money hypothesis. Previous studies for the US economy had lent support for 
the structuralist approach (Palley, 1996b; Pollin, 1991), although we have argued about the inadequacy of the 
approach adopted by Pollin. Therefore we replicated the sort of Granger causality tests proposed by Palley -
with a few modifications of our own- using monetary data from the Spanish economy stretching for nearly 
twelve years. The results are supportive of the structuralist approach. In particular we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that Granger causality runs predominantly from bank lending to both the monetary base (and 
therefore banks´ reserves) and the various money multipliers. The former is supportive of the endogenous 
money hypothesis in a general sense whereas the latter points against the accommodationist approach. 
Therefore, the results of this study confirm, at least provisionally, the results previously obtained for the US 
economy by Palley.
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APPENDIX
 
Section 1.1
The test format used to discriminate empirically between a trend-stationary process and a difference-
stationary process  was:
 (3)
for a standard ADF test and
(4)
for the Perron version of an ADF test.
 
 
Section 1.2
The ADF test format  we used to discriminate between a simple random-walk and a AR
(1) process with constant where the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is less than unity was (Johnston and 
DiNardo, 1997, p.225): 
 (5)
 
Section 2.1 
This section contains the correlograms corresponding to the Lm1, Lm2, Lm3, LBM and LLoans series. 
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
 
Section 2.2
This section contains the correlograms corresponding to the DLm3 and DLLoans series.
 
 
Figure 7
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Notas a pie de página
 
1. Moore argues that the range will depend on the willingness and ability of the monetary authorities to 
intervene forcefully in financial and foreign exchange markets and that the range may differ widely 
over time and among different countries. A detailed discussion of this particular issue can be found in 
Moore (1988, p.266-76).
2. According to Moore, the level of reserve requirements affects the volume of bank intermediation in 
the manner of an indirect tax. He also argues that, by changing the proportion of assets that banks 
must hold in the form of non-interest-bearing government debt, changes in reserve requirements alter 
the required mark-up on bank earning asset portfolios over the cost of funds necessary to earn any 
particular rate of return on equity (Moore, 1988, p.96). 
3. In a recent paper, Palley coined the term "superstructuralism" to refer to a position according to 
which, private sector interest rates would change as loan demand changes even in the case where the 
central bank holds the line on the federal funds rate (Palley, 1998, p.171). This change in interest rates 
would be the result of banks´ balance sheet transformation -leading to changes in risk positions - 
brought about by increases in lending to the non-bank private sector. However, Palley himself admits 
that his own model is not "superstructuralist" because banks have buffer stock holdings of bonds and 
they just swap those holdings with the Fed in order to obtain the additional reserves needed to back 
and fund new loans (Palley, 1998, p.172). He further points out that, were those buffer stocks to be 
exhausted, his own model would become superstructuralist. Since we believe this second scenario to 
be rather uncommon, we restrict our consideration of the structuralist argument to the point we 
develop below. 
 
4. The liability management process focuses, according to Palley (1996b, p.116) on inducing the non-
bank private sector to shift away from demand deposits (which have high reserve requirements) and 
into time deposits and other long-term deposits (with low reserve requirements). In addition, he draws 
attention to the buffer stock role played by secondary reserves (mainly fixed-income financial assets 
such as government securities), which buffer variations in the liquidity position of the banking system. 
 
5. According to Pollin (1996, p.498), a defining characteristic of a successful financial innovation is one 
in which the liquidity of higher yielding assets is increased, thereby allowing yield differentials to 
decline.
6. As Rousseas (1992, p.94) points out, the Keynesian explanation of changes in velocity focuses on 
the activation of idle balances and the economizing of transactions balances in response to central 
bank-induced increases in the rate of interest. This explanation would entail a movement along a 
money velocity curve in money velocity-interest rate space. The effect of liability management upon 
money velocity would rather take the form of an upward shift of the money velocity curve. 
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7. A necessary condition for the estimation of an autorregressive distributed lag model - required for 
running a Granger causality test - is either the stationarity of the series involved in the model or the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between the regressors and the independent variable. If that 
is not the case we would face both the possibility of running spurious regressions (Granger and 
Newbold, 1974) and that regression coefficients might not actually converge to constants with 
increasing sample size as in the standard case (Phillips, 1983). Since it is unlikely that a cointegrating 
relationship between reserves, money multipliers and bank lending exists -for there is no theoretical 
basis for expecting such a relationship to exist- making the series stationary -if they are not- seems to 
be the only choice we have left when trying to run a Granger causality test. 
8. Our postulated hypotheses differ slightly from the hypotheses postulated by Palley (1996b, p.118). 
This is due to the fact that we have explicitly placed the problem in a dynamic framework. As a result 
of it, we understand that Palley´s postulated hypotheses should be slightly modified. First, Palley does 
not include as an implication deriving from the accommodationist approach the hypothesis that bank 
lending does not Granger cause the various money multipliers. Second, Palley also presents as an 
implication deriving from the structuralist approach the hypothesis that both the monetary base and the 
money multipliers Granger cause bank lending, as well as the other way round (Palley, 1996b, p.118). 
As for the first case, we believe that, once financial innovation has been removed by making all series 
stationary, a necessary implication of the accommodationist approach, is that bank lending can not 
Granger cause the various money multipliers. As for the second case, Palley argues that increased 
lending causes liability transformations that increase the values of the money multipliers and reserves 
through increased non-borrowed and borrowed reserves. He goes on to argue that changes in asset 
preferences or changes in the supply of reserves cause changes in lending, so that both the monetary 
base and the money multipliers also Granger cause bank lending. Despite the plausibility of changes 
in asset preferences and the supply of reserves leading to changes in bank lending in Granger´s 
sense, we do not believe that their empirical rejection would imply refutation of the structuralist 
approach, because the dominant causality direction, provided the endogenous money hypothesis 
holds, must run from bank lending to all the remaining variables. Therefore, we consider that the null 
hypothesis whose rejection should lead to direct refutation of the structuralist approach is that bank 
lending Granger causes both the monetary base and the various money multipliers. 
9. Generally, for a pair of linear covariance-stationary time series X and Y, Granger (1969, p.428-9) 
proposed the following interpretation of X being causally related to Y: X causes Y if the past values of 
X can be used to predict Y more accurately than simply using the past values of Y. Formally, X is said 
to cause Y if and only if  ( : , ) < ( : ), where represents the variance of 
forecast error and j=1,2,3,.......,n. 
10. Before 1987 the Bank of Spain regulated banks´ reserves in an attempt to hit monetary targets.
11. In March 1990 the Bank of Spain implemented a substantial reduction from 17 to 5 in the 
percentage of reserves banks had to keep in a central bank account at a zero interest rate as a 
proportion of their selected liabilities (weighted by their relative maturity period and/or their liquidity). In 
order to avoid the negative consequences for the system that would have derived from a sudden 
increase in the volume of liquidity produced by the reduction in required reserves, the Bank of Spain 
issued Certificates of Deposit (which could only be traded among the institutions subject to required 
reserves maintenance and between these institutions and the central bank) that would gradually reach 
maturity along a ten-year period. From March 1990 onwards, these financial assets were used by the 
Bank of Spain in the context of open-market operations (repurchase agreements) to regulate the 
volume of liquidity in the system (Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España, 1997, p.492). 
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12. In striking-price auctions bids are ranked by descending value and all successful bidders pay the 
uniform price of the lowest bid necessay to clear the market. In bid-price auctions successful bidders 
pay the price that they bid (Howells and Bain, 1998, p.156).
13. By using different lag lengths for each relationship we were actually reducing the risk of coming 
across a model specification problem. The former could arise as the result of omitting relevant lagged 
values of the dependent variable.
14. The monetary aggregates in Spain are defined the following way. M1comprises currency in the 
hands of the non-bank private sector plus sight deposits in the Bank of Spain and commercial banks. 
M2 comprises M1 plus demand deposits at savings banks. M3 basically comprised M2 plus time 
deposits at commercial banks until May 1991. In June 1991 the Bank of Spain broadened the M3 
definition and included some additional financial assets. However we kept the old definition in order to 
get homogeneous time series covering all the period considered. Finally, the variable Loans comprises 
credit granted by the banking system (deposit institutions) to the non-bank private sector.
15. Since all time series exhibit a trend, the appropiate unit root test format (see section 1.1 in the 
appendix) is that one which attempts to discriminate empirically between a trend-stationary process 
and a difference-stationary process (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, p.224). In our case, since all 
variables were trending, the difference-stationary process was necessarily a random-walk with drift.
16. It has recently been argued that neglecting level shifts or breaking trends leads to spurious unit 
roots whereas neglecting additive outliers leads to a spurious finding of stationarity (Franses, 1998, 
p.148).
17. The selection of the lag length was done according to the lag criterion (Hendry and Doornik, 1999, 
p.42) which consists of selecting the highest lag with a significant t-probability. As Johnston and 
DiNardo (1997, p.226) point out, if the series has been generated by a higher-order autoregressive 
process it is not inadequate to run a simple Dickey-Fuller test. Instead an ADF test is required. Thus 
the purpose of the additional lags in the test specification is to "whithen" the residuals (Hendry and 
Doornik, 1999, p.41). 
18. Since none of the two series exhibited a trend the purpose of the ADF test was not any more to 
discriminate empirically between a trend-stationary process and a difference-stationary process. 
Rather, the purpose of this ADF test was to discriminate between a series that had been generated by 
a pure random-walk model (non-stationary) and a series that had been generated by a AR(1) process 
with drift, where the autocorrelation coefficient was less than unity, that is, by a stationary process 
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, p. 225). 
19. The regressions we estimated to detrend the variables had the form: 
The corresponding detrended series was . 
 
20. A similar autoregressive distributed lag model appears in Palley´s work with US data (Palley, 
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1996b, p.118).
21. The null hypotheses for the corresponding F-tests for Granger-causality in equations (1) and (2) 
are  and  respectively.
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